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Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the interactions among mandated 
change agents within a post-merger integration 
context and examines the implications of their 
practices as they attempt to engage with others in a 
cross-boundary information system implementation 
project. We examine the case of the Metropolitan 
Healthcare Center, where three previously 
independent centers were merged into one, and 
follow the individuals who were appointed to ensure 
the integration of a new, mutual information system 
across the three center sites. We draw on a practice 
perspective and the notion of symbolic capital to shed 
light on post-merger practices and their outcomes. 
Our analysis suggests that one of the change agent’s 
practices of boundary consolidation through 
influence tactics were legitimized through discourses 
of authoritative knowledge and ‘group-making’. This 
facilitated the construction of symbolic boundaries 
between the merging parties, thus contributing to the 
resilience of pre-merger practices despite the 
planned intention to create change. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Post-merger integration (PMI) refers to the process of 
value-creation that organizations anticipate from a 
merger [16]. Despite the benefits that mergers can 
yield, high failure rates have been reported [28, 33]. 
Indeed, the PMI phase is often beset by problems 
such as high levels of employee stress [10], job 
dissatisfaction and employee resistance [27,24], or 
higher turnover intentions [29]. 
While employees’ resistance to PMI changes has 
been considered one of the main causes of mergers’ 
failure to live up to their initial goals [24], the 
literature on strategy stresses that examining how 
change agents – that is individuals mandated by 
upper management to implement PMI changes and to 
ensure that these changes follow the strategic 
rationale [12, 18] – interpret and implement change 
and how they construct their work environment can 
shed light on some of the unintended outcomes of a 
change process [1, 26].  
When change agents are involved in change 
initiatives across boundaries such as those called for 
in post-merger integration, they are involved in 
boundary spanning, defined as a practice that links an 
organization or a business unit to its environment, 
including other organizations with which it interacts 
[23]. Their role, as change agents in such a context, is 
to reconfigure, if not remove, boundaries so that 
collaborative work will flow efficiently. In order to 
realize their change objectives, change agents often 
rely on influence tactics and use of networks [14], 
coercion, and authoritative or supportive persuasion 
[21]. The idea is that PMI change agents will 
promote boundary spanning by using their relational 
power within their respective organizations.  
A merger often implies the implementation of 
new information systems (IS) that will span across 
previously independent organizations [27]. Research 
has shown, albeit not in a PMI context, that the 
success of IS implementation initiatives is highly 
dependent on effective collaboration among 
individuals [25]. Given the special context of the PMI 
process, collaboration initiatives are likely to be 
challenging since the actors involved abide by 
different local, social and cultural rules emerging 
from different pre-merger organizational context 
delineated by pre-merger boundaries and actors’ 
interpretations of what is “at stake” for them [31]. In 
such a context, the mandated change agents are 
important organizational advocates for implementing 
the new system.  
However, despite targeted efforts, PMI change 
processes sometimes fail or lead to unintended 
outcomes. In fact, it has been shown that even change 
agents might sometimes resist change and obstruct 
collaboration efforts [18], despite their pronounced 
mission to promote change. To shed more light on 
this phenomenon and explore the relationship 
 
 
between post-merger practices and their outcomes we 
investigate the questions: How do change agents use 
influence tactics and what are the implications of 
these practices on the outcomes of cross-boundary IS 
projects in a PMI context?  
Drawing on a practice perspective [2], we analyze 
change agents’ utilization of symbolic capital during 
the process of post-merger boundary reconfiguration. 
We conduct a case study within a large metropolitan 
healthcare center (MHC) that resulted from the 
merger of three previously independent hospitals. 
The case is an IS implementation project – from 
project inception until the system was put in 
production – carried out over a period of six years: 
the ambulatory appointment information system 
(AAIS).  
 
2. The Practice Perspective and the Power 
of Symbolic Capital 
 
Within a given field of practice, agents are 
distinguished by their status, which is characterized 
by the accumulated amount of three types of 
individual capital: economic capital (e.g., personal 
finance), cultural capital (e.g., expertise) and social 
capital (based on professional relationships) [2]. 
Agents can transform either of their capitals into a 
fourth type, symbolic capital, which may give them 
the ability to claim relevant knowledge or 
authoritative knowledge [31]. According to Suchman 
[25, p.142], authoritative knowledge can be described 
as a knowledge that is “taken to be legitimate, 
consequential, worthy of discussion, and useful for 
justifying actions by people engaged in 
accomplishing some concerted task”. Thus, symbolic 
capital represents the ability to successfully define 
reality, thereby shaping the practices of others. For 
one to acquire symbolic capital, one must experience 
a process of valuation [2]. In cross-boundary 
collaboration, which is based on the possession of 
intellectual, social, and economic capital, an agent’s 
claims of authoritative knowledge must be perceived 
as ‘valid’ by the audience, who then attributes 
legitimacy to the agent. In this vein, the positions 
agents occupy in a given field and the forms of 
capital they possess matter, but only to the extent that 
others in the situation value those positions and forms 
of capital, converting them into a source of symbolic 
power. 
The differences in meanings and interests 
between fields of practice are usually negotiated by 
boundary spanners [4]. Boundary spanners may be 
nominated or may emerge, but to be effective they 
must be viewed as legitimate participants in the fields 
of practice being spanned and recognized as 
negotiators between fields, and they must be 
motivated to act as negotiators [18]. However, as 
Levina and Vaast [18] found in their study, some 
boundary spanners may use their formal power to 
obstruct the collaboration efforts across boundaries 
and resist change.   
 
2.1 Discursive Legitimation Strategies as 
Explanation for Unintended Outcomes   
 
Discursive legitimation represents symbolic capital 
that emerges through a political rationalization 
process of downplaying one's own interest and 
making explicit the opponent's interest. In this view, 
legitimacy or its opposite term, illegitimacy, are 
created in relation to discourses that provide the 
frames of mind with which individuals make sense of 
particular situations. In the context of PMI, 
legitimation, as creating a sense of positive, 
acceptable status quo and delegitimation, as creating 
a negative sense of change, may represent resistance 
to change initiatives [28].  
Discourses are persistent systems of thought 
(including ideas, attitudes, beliefs and practices) that 
enable and constrain what can be thought, said and 
done [3]. In this study, we analyze two legitimation 
discourses: 1) authoritative knowledge discourse 
[25]; and 2) ‘group-making’ discourse [3]. We 
operationalize them as symbolic capital-based 
discourses [2] and as such, we view them as 
discursive strategies through which senses of 
legitimacy or illegitimacy are created.  
The discourse of ‘group-making’ is characterized 
by “logic of existence by delegation” or “by proxy” 
[3]. The social reality, according to Bourdieu [3], can 
be objectively divided into different social spaces, the 
occupants of which are said to be sharing objective 
similarities and thus constitute groups or classes. But, 
Bourdieu argues, no real group exists without some 
agent naming the group and therefore bringing it into 
existence. Thus, a group exists or emerges when 
there are agents capable of imposing themselves, who 
are authorized to speak and act officially in its name. 
In this view, the production and reproduction of 
groups by creating symbolic boundaries is seen as 
necessary during agents’ participation in struggles 
over the classification and representation of 
communities and represents an act of resistance to 
any action that may affect the group structural 
integrity. Symbolic boundaries are conceptual 
distinctions made by organizational members to 
acquire power status, monopolize resources, 
categorize people and practices and generate feelings 
of similarity and group membership [15]. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This research was conducted as a case study, which 
represents a research approach which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics existing within single 
settings [9]. In this way, the researcher is able to 
identify emerging dimensions of the phenomenon 
and the relationships that emerge from the study 
through the researcher’s interaction with the 
organization members within their context. 
 
3.1 Research Context 
 
We focus on one specific IS project, the development 
of an ambulatory appointment information system 
(AAIS) that was expected to enable the post-merger 
integration of separate but similar site-based 
departments (ambulatory services). The selected 
organization was the Metropolitan Healthcare Center 
(MHC – not the real name), a Canadian tertiary care 
teaching institution. The MHC is the result of a 
‘merger of equals’ of three independent teaching 
hospitals with over 1 million patient visits per year: 
two Adult hospitals (the Downtown and the 
Midtown) and a Pediatric hospital. While the term 
‘acquisition’ refers to the purchase of a target 
organization for absorption into the acquiring 
organization, in a ‘merger of equals’, merging parties 
are considered full partners and when PMI 
approaches do not reflect the pre-merger promises, 
the result may be dissatisfaction and distrust.  
The merger was initiated with the goal of creating 
a mega-hospital to provide modern health care by 
implementing a “best practices” approach for 
coordinating care. In the pre-merger context, the 
MHC hospitals developed their own sets of 
applications, both for the clinical-administrative and 
administrative application portfolios. Also, each 
hospital center had its own medical patient index and 
patient ID card, used several and separate patient 
scheduling systems, managed beds and emergency 
rooms according to the internal site perspective, 
operated its own and distinct order entry and result 
reporting system and produced statistics specific to 
the patient stays within the specific center sites.  
According to the MHC IS Strategic Plan, the 
post-merger application portfolio needed to adapt to a 
seamless, integrated organization that would result 
from the redesign of the business processes. The 
patients would have a single number and ID card 
linked to a single record number used by all MHC 
centers. According to the IS Project manager, 
“because of the expected magnitude of the process 
redesign”, keeping legacy systems in use was 
considered to be an ineffective cost option. At the 
outset of the AAIS project, the ambulatory services 
managers from the three different centers were thus 
enlisted in a project team to act as change agents and 
enable the development and implementation of the 
mutual system. 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with the 
persons who had held key roles in the project (see 
Table 1). A total of 12 interviews (six interviewees in 
two rounds of interviews) were performed. They 
were based on a pre-designed protocol and lasted 
between 30 and 45 minutes each. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. The interviews were 
supplemented by archival documents (e.g., strategic 
planning sessions, management presentations, emails, 
and communications planning), which offered a 
source of triangulation for the themes that emerged 
from the interview data. Due to their sensitive content 
and the data privacy laws, we were allowed to 
consult these documents only on site. These 
documents were used in three ways.  
 
Table 1. List of Interviewees 
Function at the outset 
of the project 
Referred to 
in the text as 
Center  
Ambulatory Services 
Manager (ASM) 
Midtown 
manager 
Midtown 
ASM Downtown 
manager 
Downtown  
ASM Pediatric 
manager 
Pediatric 
IS Project manager IS Manager MHC 
IS Specialist  MHC 
IS Specialist  MHC 
 
First, the various reports and presentations were used 
to assist us in putting together the project’s 
chronology, including identifying the dates of 
important events and decision junctures. Second, 
emails and management presentations were used to 
formulate and refine interview questions. Third, 
reports and meeting minutes were used to corroborate 
and validate interview reports. Each interview was 
semi-structured with both a structured interview 
guide and room for unstructured questions. In a few 
instances, when clarifications were required, follow-
up questions were asked via phone or email. 
Interview questions focused on understanding, from 
the participant’s standpoint, the history of the project 
collaboration practices, claims of relevant 
knowledge, differences in system’s functionalities 
 
 
between the initial and the go-live phases of the 
project, as well as the personal implications of the 
merger. When no new information was revealed 
during interviews, data collection was terminated. 
 
3.3 Data analysis 
 
The interview data were analyzed in an iterative 
process [9] by cycling between data, emerging 
themes, and relevant literature to develop a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of the cross-boundary 
collaboration during the IS implementation process. 
First, we created a provisional “start list” of codes 
(Table 2) informed by our theoretical perspective 
prior to the interviews. Second, the interview 
transcripts were read carefully and relevant portions 
highlighted. The highlighted portions were then 
keyed into the database into a field called “evidence” 
as chunks of rich text. All of the transcripts were 
coded using the preliminary set of codes. In line with 
our theory-building objective, we remained open to 
emerging themes, which can lead to the creation of 
new codes and categories when appropriate [20]. 
Thus, the key category of boundary consolidation 
was created. Following this, we entered a new coding 
iteration, going back to the transcripts and coding 
them anew to take into account the new category. We 
relied on authors’ agreement and consensus to 
reconcile any coding disagreement.  
 
Table 2. Coding Categories 
Initial Coding List 
Categories 
Differences in practices 
Fields of practice 
Boundaries 
Cross-boundary collaboration 
practices 
IS design 
Individual capital 
Role of boundary spanners 
Symbolic discourses 
Emerging Category Boundary consolidation 
 
4. Findings 
 
From the outset, teamwork was organized by peer-
based collaboration without a formal project manager 
from the user side. The three managers soon realized 
that they needed someone to follow up on decisions 
after each meeting and act as a liaison with the IS 
developers. The Pediatric center manager thus 
emerged as the leader of the group because she was 
the only one having worked in an IS implementation 
project before. The other team members found her 
charismatic, experienced and respected in her work 
community. Retrospectively, the Pediatric manager 
also saw herself, in the context of the project, as 
being: “the spearhead … the catalyst… the person 
that is the glue that holds this together and gives 
direction, keeps people on track”. (Pediatric 
manager) She considered herself a leader and found 
it normal to take the lead in the implementation 
process.  
Team meetings involved exchanging clear 
information about the needs of each member’s own 
department in order to effectively negotiate and 
convince the others of the need for specific system 
features. The outcomes of these discussions were 
often a compromise representing the result of various 
claims of legitimate knowledge made by the manager 
from the Pediatric center based on her past 
experience in implementing clinical administrative 
IS. During this period, the three managers were going 
back to their centers and consulting with key players 
in the clinics to make sure that the system that they 
were trying to put together was in fact reflective of 
what the clinics’ needs were. As the project 
progressed, the Pediatric manager successfully 
negotiated changes to the software functionality, 
tailoring it to suit the needs of the Pediatric center. 
While one of the goals of the pre-merger MHC 
strategic plan was to implement a common set of 
administrative practices, at the end of AAIS project, 
MHC ambulatory services presented two different 
sets of practices: one, at the Pediatric center, that 
preserved pre-merger norms and another, at the two 
Adult centers, that can be described as new practices 
common to both entities. 
 
4.1 Theme 1: The Emergence of Symbolic 
Capital  
 
Change agents in cross-boundary collaboration are 
expected to bring expertise specific to their role to the 
endeavor at hand. For example, in a new product 
implementation effort, participants bring distinctive 
expertise to shape the features, performance, and 
production processes for the new product [5]. Their 
distinction is accentuated by the fact that agents on 
each side of the boundary have accumulated different 
kinds of capital [2] and their respective fields of 
practice may be significantly different. Each of the 
three ambulatory service managers, who had worked 
for several years in the three respective pre-merger 
hospitals, were highly regarded by the upper 
management, and had accumulated distinct 
knowledge, experience and expertise in terms of 
managing patient registration, appointments, waiting 
lists, etc. In the first few months of the project, the 
three managers had to share their knowledge of the 
ambulatory procedures used in each of their centers. 
 
 
To their surprise, they realized that, even though 
those site-based procedures seemed similar, their 
execution varied from one field of practice to 
another.  
At the outset of the project, the three team 
members were not aware of significant differences 
between their practices due to the fact that they never 
had to interact before.  
“In the first three months, that knowledge 
transfer, in terms of how they [the other centers] do it 
versus how we [Downtown center] do it, it was a very 
novel thing because you tend to think the way you do 
things is the entire universe right and so it’s been a 
wakeup call to discover that there are all kinds of 
different ways of approaching the same process, the 
same basic function” (Downtown manager) 
Not only had they never met before, but they also 
had never been involved in the development of a 
similar IS.  
“What we discovered was the way that the clinics 
work at the Adult hospitals versus the Pediatric was 
very, very different […] In fact a lot of the differences 
between procedures… came along many times as a 
result of discussions around the user group table 
during the development […] As far as the Pediatric, 
it is black box.  I know a little bit because I take my 
children there when they are sick, that’s it” (Midtown 
manager) 
Even though they were all officially employees of 
the MHC, the fact that they were coming from 
different hospitals and were now supposed to share 
knowledge and develop a common system presented 
some initial challenges: 
“So it took us a little while to do that because 
there was a group of people that had never met each 
other before so figuring out a way to work together 
was initially a bit of a challenge” (Midtown 
manager); “Actually we didn’t know each other. We 
had never met. I met [Downtown manager] there; I 
had never met him before. You thought of yourself as, 
I’m site specific” (Pediatric manager) 
The case data show that the three center 
managers, who were appointed as change agents and 
boundary spanners by the upper management, 
possessed significant amounts of social and 
intellectual capital accumulated in time within their 
fields of practice at the outset of the implementation 
process. Even though the change agents had never 
met before, they were aware of the other agents’ 
hierarchical position and had heard of their 
professional reputation within their respective fields 
of practice. They went through a quick process of 
valuation of each other’s accumulated individual 
capital at the outset of the project. 
“[The Pediatric manager] was very quickly taken 
on a leadership role… We all respected the hell out 
of her. [The Downtown manager] was always in 
there advocating for her clerks.” (Midtown manager)  
“[The Midtown manager] was very good at 
arguing the pros and cons of a certain functionality.” 
(Pediatric manager)  
“I would say [Midtown manager] for his 
experience of how things worked at Midtown because 
he’s been there a lot longer than me.” (Downtown 
manager)  
However, only the Pediatric manager tried and 
successfully converted her accumulated intellectual 
and social capitals into symbolic capital to claim 
authoritative knowledge.  
“Information Systems is my field of competence, 
so it’s very easy to talk to a programmer. I provided a 
good sort of leadership in that sense […] I had 
fought for getting it for the Pediatric center, because 
there’s nothing worse than implementing a new 
system and losing functionality of the things you had 
before […] I’m sure they [at the Adult centers] don’t 
really care what system we have due to the fact that 
the Pediatric clinics don’t need to communicate any 
patient data to the Adult clinics. (Pediatric manager)  
While during the project meetings most issues 
were solved by an immediate consensus or through 
persuasion based on trade-offs, in some rare instances 
the Pediatric manager used her accumulated symbolic 
capital to unilaterally make a decision. For example, 
when she asked for a specific modular interface to be 
built into the system, the Downtown manger didn’t 
understand its utility for her center’s clinics. The 
Pediatric manager notes that she tried to argue for her 
need but to no avail: 
“[Downtown manager] wouldn’t let go. She 
couldn’t understand why we needed that, and at one 
point it was like, look, I’m going to get it for the 
[Pediatric], whether you understand or not, I’m 
getting it” (Pediatric manager). 
  
4.2 Theme 2: Resisting Change by Boundary 
Consolidation 
 
The Pediatric manager engaged in symbolic 
discourses of ‘group-making’ that would present her 
as an authorized voice to represent the Pediatric 
population and its needs with respect to the 
ambulatory clinics. She described the members of the 
Pediatric field of practice as being completely 
different from the members of the other centers of the 
MHC and referred to herself as ‘we’ and ‘us’. During 
the system implementation at the Pediatric center she 
tried hard to classify her field of practice (Pediatric 
ambulatory services) as being unique compared to the 
 
 
other two fields of practice in front of the other two 
change agents and to refute any idea of integration. 
“I think in terms of like structure and follow up 
and whatever, I provided a good sort of leadership in 
that sense. […] I have to say, we being, the Pediatric, 
probably influenced a lot because the whole project 
actually came from a needs analysis that we had 
submitted […]. They moved Orthopedics from the 
Downtown and centralized it at the Midtown. I think 
they’ve redone some of their management structure 
in terms of that. But that didn’t affect us. So the 
Pediatric will remain independent” (Pediatric 
manager)   
Although the mandate of the change agents was to 
entice the others to collaborate and alter the pre-
merger boundaries, the Pediatric manager focused all 
her efforts on what was “at stake”, protecting the 
existing boundaries between her field of practice and 
the rest of MHC. She used her symbolic capital to 
promote the idea that Adult centers and the Pediatric 
center were engaged in business processes that were 
so different that they could not be integrated into the 
same system. A specific type of data confidentiality 
was one of her main arguments that the Pediatric 
center was different from the two Adult centers and 
due to its procedural and clinical differences her 
center should never be integrated with the rest of the 
MHC. 
“You have convictions about the way certain 
things should function or not. For example, 
confidentiality of information is a big topic… For 
example, ‘I’m calling, I’m in the middle of a divorce; 
I don’t want my husband to know my phone number’. 
So, the big question is how do you block that 
information, are you able to flag it? So obviously for 
us in Pediatric it’s a huge issue because we deal with 
that kind of situation. On the adult side, not that 
much.” (Pediatric manager) 
 
On the one hand, the Pediatric manager thought that 
the Pediatric center should keep its clinical practice 
independence, while the main administrative 
functions, such as Finance and HR would be fully 
integrated in the structures of the MHC. Pediatric 
manager was convinced that the development of the 
new AAIS had more to do with implementing a 
system that would make the management of the 
ambulatory services more efficient, than with the 
merger. Thus, she tried to convey the message that it 
was in the Adult centers’ interest to concentrate on 
their own clinical data. 
“I’m pretty sure they [Adult centers] don’t really 
care what system we have due to the fact that the 
Pediatric clinics don’t need to communicate any 
patient data with the clinics on the Adult side of the 
MHC.” (Pediatric manager) 
By using a mixed symbolic ‘group-making’ and 
claims of relevant knowledge that skewed the 
existing power dynamics within the project team, the 
Pediatric manager was able to reproduce the Pediatric 
hospital’s old, resilient practices into the system 
configuration. Therefore, at the end of the 
implementation project, the resulting common AAIS 
had two database instances, one for the Pediatric 
center, which enabled the preservation of the pre-
merger practices and another one for the Adult 
centers that enabled new common administrative 
practices. At the end of the project, the boundary 
between the Pediatric and the rest of the MHC 
centers in terms of ambulatory services were still up 
instead of having been erased, which would have 
been the logical outcome of the PMI process.  
Figure 1 illustrates this process of boundary 
consolidation.  
Pre-merger 
Pediatric 
practices 
Pre-merger 
Adult 
practices 
practices 
Change agents’ 
collaboration 
Outset: Unknown differences in practices 
(boundaries between fields of practice)  
Valuation of  
Pediatric 
manager’s 
symbolic capital 
and authoritative 
knowledge  
Triggers 
consolidation 
of fields 
boundaries  
AAIS 
Pediatric 
instance 
Planned common best practices 
AAIS Adult 
instance 
Outcome: ‘Group-making’ discourse-based 
resistance to change by consolidating boundaries   
Figure 1: The process of boundary consolidation 
 
 
“I would say we [Adult centers] are now reaching 
the point of blend I suppose because we’re trying to 
take best practice from each center [adult] and 
putting it together […], but as far as I’m aware, the 
Pediatric is standalone” (IS manager) 
  
5. Discussion 
 
We report the findings of a case study of an IS 
implementation project aimed at unifying the 
ambulatory practices of a large healthcare center that 
resulted from the merging of three hospitals and 
supporting them with a unique, mutual information 
system. In this project, three department managers 
were appointed as center-based team leaders and 
nominated as change agents and boundary spanners. 
The case focuses on the interactions between the 
three managers and specifically shows how one of 
the department managers, the Pediatric manager, 
successfully used her symbolic capital to make 
claims of authoritative knowledge. This in term led to 
the consolidation of pre-merger boundaries and 
legitimized the exclusion of her department from the 
merging exercise.  
This boundary reinforcement represents an 
unintended outcome of an intended organizational 
change imposed by a merger. The Pediatric manager 
instead of acting as a change agent actually acted as a 
boundary consolidator by engaging in discourses of 
authoritative knowledge [25], and ‘group-making’ [3] 
that facilitated her actions. Based on symbolic 
discourses, boundary consolidation represents a 
means for resisting the change brought in by a 
merger. The two discourses represent the basis for 
making claims about specific actions of boundary 
spanners. While these discourses are not specific to 
an organizational context, the events that triggered 
them in our case study are specific to a post-merger 
integration environment. 
These symbolic discourses were necessary for the 
Pediatric manager to represent her field of practice 
during the struggle over classifying the Pediatric 
center as being unique and its environment not being 
ready to be included within the MHC. The existence 
of a relationship between the Pediatric manager’s 
discursive strategy and her use of the accumulated 
symbolic capital pointed to the fact that the Pediatric 
manager pursued not only individual, but also 
collective interests to resist the change in practices. 
The Pediatric manager’s collective representations 
inculcated the reality of the existing boundaries 
between the Pediatric center and the Adult centers as 
something that could not be changed during the 
process of system implementation. It also threatened 
to trigger “power dynamics that undermine 
collaboration” [19, p. 310]. The Pediatric manager 
mixed symbolic group-making and claims of relevant 
knowledge that skewed the existing power dynamics 
within the project team and helped her justify the way 
the system was configured (reflecting pediatric center 
pre-merger practices).  
 
5.1 Contribution #1: Change agent as resistor 
 
By addressing the boundary spanning literature, the 
main contribution of this study relates to the 
theoretical development of a practice perspective-
based discursive analysis of the outcomes of a cross-
boundary IS integration process in a PMI context, 
which includes the concept of boundary 
consolidation. The Pediatric manager illustrates what 
Levina and Vaast [18, p. 356] describe as a boundary 
spanner with symbolic capital who deliberately “fails 
to develop an interest in developing a new joint 
field”. The actions of the Pediatric manager suggest 
that sometimes change agents use their symbolic 
capital to reinforce existing boundaries and obstruct 
boundary spanning, when personal or local interests 
are at stake. Thus, instead of being an agent that 
promotes change, the agent reinforces existing 
boundaries. Boundary reinforcement or consolidation 
encompasses the ways in which an individual, 
member of a professional community (in our case a 
field of practice) internally sets and reclaims its 
boundaries by increasing member awareness of 
boundaries and emphasizing community identity 
[11].  
In the AAIS study, the Pediatric manager, who 
was mandated by the MHC upper management to 
implement PMI changes and remove boundaries for 
collaboration by bridging cognitive and knowledge 
gaps across the pre-merger boundaries, did exactly 
the opposite by reinforcing the fences between the 
Adult centers and the Pediatric center. Indeed, instead 
of focusing on commonalities and dependencies 
between the three sites, the Pediatric manager’s 
efforts and energy were invested in highlighting the 
differences (e.g. children vs. adult patients, no 
information exchange between the Pediatric and the 
Adult centers) as well as the uniqueness of the 
Pediatric center (e.g. in terms of procedures, clerical 
tasks, etc.). The Pediatric manager’s forerunner 
attitude as well as her legitimacy, based on her 
charisma, her experience and her reputation, enabled 
her to mobilize support around the idea that the 
Pediatric center on one side and the Adult centers on 
the other, had different ways of working and required 
different AAIS. She was able, through her 
authoritative knowledge and ‘group-making’ 
 
 
discourses, to redefine the “initial” strategic rationale 
of the AAIS and alter the project team’s reality by 
causing the project to deviate from its original 
objective of an integrated system to finally end up 
with the development of two separated AAIS. Thus, 
the Pediatric manager did not play the change agent 
role as it would have initially been expected by the 
upper management, but a boundary consolidator one.  
As a result of the actions of the Pediatric 
manager, the practices of the Pediatric hospital center 
remained resistant to change. Earlier research has 
suggested that suggested that change agents may 
inhibit wider adoption of a new system that would 
facilitate change of practices [22], since potential 
users perceive the new system as “for nominated 
boundary spanners to decide how to use” rather than 
“for everybody to use” [18, p. 357]. Rivard and 
Lapointe [21] proposed a taxonomy of responses 
which could be used to react to resistance: 1) Inaction 
(unawareness, deliberate ignorance, and impotence), 
2) Acknowledgement, 3) Rectification (congruent vs. 
non-congruent) and 4) Dissuasion (coercion, 
authoritative persuasion, supportive persuasion). 
However, in the AAIS case study, the Pediatric 
manager used discursive strategies akin to some of 
the responses proposed by Rivard and Lapointe [21], 
not to react to resistance, but to consolidate the 
boundaries between the Adult and Pediatric fields of 
practice. Indeed, the Pediatric manager through 
various discursive strategies, tried to modify the 
project’s initial strategic rationale by highlighting the 
differences between the fields of practice and 
persuade the rest of the project team that the project 
outcome would be better represented by two 
separated systems. Such strategies are similar to the 
non-congruent rectification and persuasion responses 
proposed by Rivard and Lapointe [21]. Thus, in our 
study we found that the Pediatric manager instead of 
using her symbolic capital to diminish boundaries, 
she strengthened them by acting as a boundary 
consolidator.  
 
5.2 Contribution #2: The Role of Symbolic 
Capital in Consolidating Boundaries 
 
Empirically, this paper enhances our understanding 
of discursive legitimation during the process of PMI 
by identifying two symbolic discourses, authoritative 
knowledge and ‘group-making’ that lead to the 
reinforcement of the pre-merger boundaries in the 
case of the Pediatric center. Our study also suggests 
that in a specific context such as mergers, some 
change agents will use their individual capital to 
interfere with planned change by engaging in 
legitimation discourses to consolidate existing 
boundaries.  
In the AAIS case study, the Pediatric manager 
used her symbolic capital and took advantage of the 
fact that the first beta testing to configure the AISS 
was implemented at the Pediatric center, to submit 
change requests to adjust/modify the software 
package’s functionalities. These changes were meant 
to reflect Pediatric center’s pre-merger practices 
without considering the Adult centers’ contexts and 
specific needs. These change requests were part of 
the Pediatric manager’s discursive strategies to 
separate the Pediatric ambulatory practices from the 
rest of the MHC. One possible explanation of 
Pediatric manager playing the role of a boundary 
consolidator may stem from the fact that she was 
simultaneously playing two opposing roles. As a 
member of the project team, she played a change 
agent role; individuals “responsible for identifying 
the need for change, creating a vision and specifying 
a desired outcome, and then making it happen” [12, 
p. 362] and, as the ambulatory service manager, she 
played a change recipient role; individuals “who are 
responsible for implementing, adopting, or adapting 
to the change(s).” [12, p. 362]. The Pediatric manager 
was both the implementer and the recipient of 
change. As a change agent, she was formally 
designated to implement the PMI changes and ensure 
that the potential turbulences caused by such major 
organizational change would not affect the main goal 
of the project, that is, having a cross-boundary 
integrated system. However, as a change recipient, 
she was responsible to adapt the new practices 
imposed by the new AAIS on the Pediatric 
ambulatory service as well as minimize the 
prospective disruptions brought to the Pediatric local 
practices. To do so, the Pediatric manager used her 
symbolic capital and various discursive strategies to 
demonstrate that, the Pediatric center was different 
and that status quo should be maintained.  Thus, it is 
possible that her dual status might have helped her 
consolidate the boundaries around the Pediatric 
center.  
 
5.3 Contribution #3: Strategies to Consolidate 
Boundaries 
 
Our study enriches the existing explanations of how 
and why intended strategies sometimes lead to 
unintended consequences [1]. Research drawing on 
socio-cognitive theories had already examined the 
role of social interactions [7] and past experience as 
sources of collective understanding, which may 
ultimately affect the outcome of an organizational 
change [32]. These theories contend that individuals’ 
 
 
thoughts about IT-led change are not formed in 
isolation but based on collectively shared 
understandings of what the technology is or how the 
technology can affect their practices. In this sense, 
Balogun and Johnson [1] suggest that unanticipated 
consequences are the result of organizational actors 
creating mental frameworks of references useful for 
the interpretation of reality through social 
interactions. In the AAIS case study, one strategy 
used by the Pediatric manager to alter the project 
team’s mental framework was by voicing issues [8].  
An issue is a “subjective ‘chunk of knowledge’ 
enacted by a stakeholder in a particular place and 
time within the project” [30, p. 46] and can be 
conceptualized as “knowledge at a boundary”. Issues 
can also be considered as vehicle for knowledge 
transfer, transaction and transformation, which will 
affect boundaries. Issues that have high levels of 
commonality and dependency between stakeholders 
should weaken boundaries whereas issues with low 
levels of commonality and dependencies should 
consolidate boundaries [30]. Also, as issues are 
intertwined with the stakeholders’ legitimacy and 
symbolic capital, some of them will have more 
influence than others. In the AAIS project, the 
Pediatric manager relied on her symbolic capital to 
ensure that the issues that she voiced would be 
considered as authoritative knowledge. She also 
voiced issues that would minimize the possible 
commonalities between the Pediatric center’s 
practices and those of the Adult centers’ in order to 
consolidate the boundaries between the three MHC 
sites. Thus, our study provides a practice lens and an 
issue management perspective on why and how 
social processes of interaction between managers 
engaged in making sense of intended changes may 
lead to unintended outcomes.   
 
6. Conclusion and Limitations 
 
This study examines the practices of appointed 
change agents in a PMI cross-boundary IS 
implementation project and highlights their use of 
influence tactics to promote or resist change. We 
show that when personal or local interests are at 
stake, sometimes change agents use their symbolic 
capital to reinforce existing boundaries and obstruct 
boundary spanning. The process is based on other 
actors’ valuation of the change agent’s symbolic 
capital and authoritative knowledge, something 
which may serve to legitimize boundary 
consolidation instead of boundary spanning. Thus, 
instead of being an agent that promotes change, the 
agent reinforces existing boundaries. As such, this 
study extends previous studies on boundary spanning 
[18] by introducing the concept of boundary 
consolidation and adds to the existing explanations of 
how intended strategies sometimes lead to 
unintended consequences [1]. The case study also 
provides rich data documenting the challenges 
organizations face when they try to merge fields of 
practice and support them with a common 
information system.  
 The main limitation of this study might be that it 
attempts at generalizing only from empirical 
statements to theoretical statements from a case study 
[17]. However, it has been shown that statistical, 
sampling-based generalizability may be an unsuitable 
goal for qualitative studies [6]. The MHC case is 
built on a strong historical foundation and deals with 
issues of central importance to our research which 
makes it purposeful. Learning from this case can now 
be transferred to other contexts for further 
refinements that eventually will offer statistical 
generalizability. Looking at industry level data and 
data from other settings may help overcome this 
limitation and provide new understandings.  
The theoretical explanation offered here opens up 
avenues for more in-depth explorations of some of 
the more complex processes associated with the 
dynamic relationship between the change agents and 
IT-enabled organizational change. Future studies 
should assess in more depth how the actors involved 
in cross-boundaries IS projects interact and how the 
nature of these interactions affects the outcomes of 
the projects. In this vein, an explanatory-based 
theorization by identifying social mechanisms, that is 
processes composed of actions, events and “chains or 
aggregations of actors confronting problem situations 
and mobilizing more or less habitual responses” [13, 
p. 368], would explain the intermediate events that 
would partially influence the evolution from an initial 
state of a phenomenon to a final observed outcome. 
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